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2. Beijing’s Economy: 
 Dream a Little Dream of China?
Alessia Amighini
Dream talking
Since the beginning of his mandate in late 2012, Xi Jinping, the cur-
rent head of the Communist Party (CCP), chose the “China Dream” 
as his doctrine, following Chinese tradition since Mao to identify a 
personal slogan for each term1. The “China Dream” artfully evokes 
the American Dream – “the notion that the American social, eco-
nomic, and political system makes success possible for every indi-
vidual2” – but in fact is far less individualistic and utilitarian than its 
American counterpart, and actually refers to the aim of a prosperous 
society in collective terms. As the Chinese economy is expected 
to overtake America’s within a decade, by evoking the American 
dream, Xi aims to reassure the country’s new middle-class that 
they will eventually be able to reach prosperity, despite economic 
growth being slower under Mr Xi than it was under Mr Hu.
At the same time, the China Dream doctrine cleverly shows off 
Xi’s ambitions to restore China’s role in the world3. After decades 
of extraordinary rise, China is today the world’s second largest eco-
nomy, with hundreds of millions of Chinese lifted out of poverty 
and hundreds of millions who joined the middle class, but that rise 
1 See chapter 1 in this volume.
2 American Dream, Collins English Dictionary, avalaibale at collinsenglishdctionary.com.
3 See chapter 4 in this volume.
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has not yet gone along with a comparable rise of China’s position 
in global economic governance. With a GDP now around 90 per 
cent of U.S. GDP in purchasing power parity terms, and about one-
sixth of the world’s total, China is rapidly recovering the position it 
had in the early 1800s, when China was the largest manufacturing 
country in the world and its GDP was one-third of the world’s total. 
Dreaming of a day when China’s economy becomes once more the 
biggest in the world, Xi secures the support of nationalists, particu-
larly within the armed forces, who have been allured with the mes-
sage that the “strong-nation dream of a great revival of the Chinese 
people” is in effect a “strong-army dream”, in contrast with the libe-
rals’ ambitions to remove the army from the party’s direct control4.
Backed by the overall aim of the China Dream, Xi has so far 
aimed at orchestrating domestic policy reforms his own way with 
the support of constituencies and forces whose support is essential 
for the reform process to be effective. One such constituency is the 
new middle class. According to Li Chunling, “since the beginning 
of this century, a social group with higher income, higher education 
and higher occupational prestige has been emerging in Chinese cit-
ies5”. This followed the beginning of a major ideological and policy 
shift in 2000, when Jiang Zemin “in contrast to the Marxist notion 
that the Communist Party should be the “vanguard of the working 
class”, argued that the CCP should broaden its base of power to 
include entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and technocrats, all of whom 
regularly occupy the ranks of the middle-income stratum, the of-
ficial euphemism for the middle class”6. Although it has been called 
“middle class” by the public media, the official jargon has never 
adopted such a term, but a number of nuanced versions of it, and a 
lively scholarly and public debate has since been ongoing about the 
definition of middle class in China7. Since then, the so-called middle 
4 “Chasing the Chinese Dream”, The Economist, 4 May 2013.
5 Li Chunling, Profile of  Middle Class in Mainland China, p. 1, http://e-sociology.cass.
cn/pub/pws/lichunling/grwj_lichunling/P020090525597135469507.pdf
6 Li Cheng “Introduction: The Rise of  the Middle Class in the Middle Kingdom”, in Li 
Cheng (ed.), China’s emerging middle class: beyond economic transformation, Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp. 3-31.
7 Ibid
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class has been considered a political ally of the party’s supremacy, 
being those who most benefited from China’s rapid growth over the 
last three decades. Their support is therefore vital to pursuing the 
economic and political reforms on which their future economic and 
social advancement depends. What really threatens the party’s rule 
is the rising divergence in living standards within the Chinese popu-
lation, and the latent, but increasingly worrying conflict between 
rich and poor, which could seriously undermine the aim to reach a 
“harmonious society”8.
The middle-income groups have become an important con-
stituency for the Chinese government and their satisfaction and 
support a clear policy objective of the government. This is due 
to their dual economic and political role. Their material advance-
ment has fuelled consumption and is more and more vital to sus-
tain domestic demand in the ongoing transition towards a new de-
velopment strategy, from an investment-led to a consumption-led 
growth model. Moreover, they serve as a proof that the party’s 
rule is not inconsistent with material well-being. The importance 
of the middle-income groups has long been publicly recognised 
by the Chinese authorities, who have called for “enlarging the 
size of the middle-income group” since at least 2002. More re-
cently, the middle-income groups confirmed their economic im-
portance during the recent global crisis and recession: they have 
grown in size, in contrast with a shrinking of the middle class in 
the West. This has purposefully served the aim of Chinese au-
thorities to publicize the idea that China is entering the “golden 
age” of its middle-class development9. Yet according to Li10, the 
status of China’s emerging middle-income groups is the subject 
of scholarly debates. Not everyone in middle-income groups is 
better off today than before the crisis, “partly due to the loss of 
jobs and financial assets as a result of the global financial crisis 
8 Ibid.
9 Lu Xueyi, “Xianzai shi Zhongguo zhongchan jieceng fazhan de huangjin shiqi” [It’s 
the “golden age” of  Chinese middle-class development], Zhongguo qingnian bao, Chi-
na youth daily, 11 February 2010.
10 Li, Cheng, op. cit.
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and partly because of the rapid rise of housing prices in urban 
China11”. Only a subset of the middle class, including officials 
and managers of SOEs, grew, according to Mao Yushi, and to the 
detriment of other subsets of the middle class12. The rise of the 
new middle class has been the sign of China’s embarking on the 
road to prosperity, and now its further economic advancement is 
vital to increasing overall domestic consumption and demand. 
To their ears, the China Dream provides a powerful slogan to 
revitalise domestic confidence in the country’s future prospects, 
at a time when they are increasingly anxious about being nega-
tively affected by the transition to a new growth model, since the 
ongoing rebalancing of the sources of economic growth in China 
implies a sensible slowdown compared to Hu’s times, and painful 
restructuring in many sectors and regions. 
Although Xi implicitly reassures that the “new normal” will not 
force the new middle class to tighten their belts, there are increasing 
signs showing that in fact they might have to dream a smaller dream 
of China than what Xi has evoked so far. Even more importantly, the 
opacity of Xi’s slogan makes it difficult to understand whether the 
China Dream, in contrast to its American namesake, actually aims 
at something more than middle-class material comfort – further ex-
pansion and advancement of the middle-income groups – or in fact 
something different from middle-class material well-being – i.e. 
overall national prosperity and ascendance in global governance.
However, – as described in chapter 1 – the definition of the China 
Dream is rather vague in substance, scope and horizons, and there-
fore purposefully serves Xi’s political objectives without the need 
for him to actually deliver on specific outcomes. Opacity about sub-
stance allows Xi to defend any policy measures and their exact op-
posites as avenues for the Dream to come true, with little possibility 
for assessment. This gives him comfortable space for manoeuvring 
any kind of policy backtracking on both economic and political re-
forms. In fact, compared with the first half of Xi’s term, when mo-
mentum was high to accelerate on both, the times are now changing 
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
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quite substantially and structural reforms are lagging behind in the 
best case, reverting in the worst case. Similarly, opacity about the 
scope allows Xi to justify any policy initiatives as contributing to 
the Dream, from tighter Party control of the economy to massive 
dismissal of former state workers, from reduction of subsidies to ex-
porting firms to increasing military spending and initiatives. Dream 
talking magically acts as an ex-ante validation for any kind of in-
tervention in the economic, political, cultural, and military spheres. 
Finally, opacity about horizons allows Xi to easily spread the alleged 
policy outcomes over an unspecified time span, ranging from a few 
quarters up to 2049. Again, this does not allow for ex-post assess-
ment and postpones political responsibilities to an indefinite future. 
However difficult an assessment might be of whether China is 
still heading to its own dream or is simply talking about it, a number 
of elements are available for discussion of the direction the country 
is taking, given the current policy stance. 
What does the China Dream mean for China’s economic 
model today?
As the “new normal” leit motif has repeatedly insisted on since the 
beginning of 2015, China’s future growth must rely on different 
drivers compared to the past. From 1990 to 2014, Chinese gross sav-
ings as a percentage of GDP and gross fixed investment as a percent-
age of GDP both increased significantly (to 50 per cent and 45 per 
cent of GDP in 2014 respectively), while private consumption as a 
percentage of GDP declined sharply (to about 35 per cent of GDP 
in 2014, compared to 60 per cent of GDP in more advanced econo-
mies). As indicated by Morrison, “China’s gross savings as a per-
centage of GDP and gross fixed investment as a percentage of GDP 
are the highest among the world’s largest economies, while China’s 
private consumption as a share of GDP is among the lowest”13.
13 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Im-
plications for the United States, Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2015.
38 China Dream: Still Coming True?
The imbalances on which China’s rapid economic growth relied 
on in the past three decades need to be resolved by rebalancing 
the sources of growth from fixed investment towards more private 
consumption. Morrison also reported that according to a “2009 In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) report, fixed investment related 
to tradable goods plus net exports together accounted for over 60 
per cent of China’s GDP growth from 2001 to 2008 (up from 40 per 
cent from 1990 to 2000). This percentage was significantly higher 
than in the G-7 countries (16%), the Eurozone (30%), and the rest 
of Asia (35%)”14. In response to the global financial crisis, which 
led to a sharp fall in demand for Chinese exports, and sharply re-
duced China’s trade surplus, the Chinese government reacted in 
part by sharply fuelling fixed investment (with easier credit access 
for firms) and, therefore fixed investment as a share of GDP rose 
from 40.5 in 2008 to 45.9 per cent in 2013.
The rapid growth of fixed investment is no longer sustainable, 
due to a number of factors including overcapacity in some manu-
facturing sectors, as well as in the real estate sector (which largely 
fostered economic growth from 2009 until 2014, when the after-
14 Ibid.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
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maths of the recent recession had depressed foreign demand for 
Chinese goods), and decreasing profitability and increasing debt 
accumulation by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Together with 
increasing fixed investment, private savings have also increased. 
The major reason for this is the lack of an adequate social safety 
net (such as pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, and 
education), which induces households to save a large portion of 
their income. 
A number of additional reasons contribute to the high saving rate 
in China, such as the unequal distribution of wage increases across 
different population groups. The highest gains went to the highest 
percentiles of urban residents, who already show a lower margin-
al propensity to consume (while wage earners in lower percentile 
groups have spent a much higher share of their income gains). As 
a result, the wage gains did not translate into more consumption, 
but instead into more savings: between 1982 and 2012, the average 
urban household saving rate rose from 12 to 32 per cent 15. 
Last but not least, the gender gap, notably far more evident in 
China than in any other country (due to the perverse impact of the 
one-child policy), is a specific factor behind the high saving rate 
in China. In fact, the excess of men over women in marrying-age 
groups forces would-be grooms (and therefore their parents) to ac-
cumulate saving to provide sufficient funds to increase the probabil-
ity of finding a bride. The business sector is also a major contributor 
to the high savings rate in China. As many Chinese firms, especially 
SOEs, do not pay dividends and retain most of their earnings, they 
prevent households to consume out of the income received from 
their unpaid dividends.
Finally, in a country that places restrictions on the export of cap-
ital, households are forced to keep a large share of their savings in 
domestic banks. And since the Chinese government often sets the 
interest rate on deposits below the inflation rate, to allow Chinese 
firms to get credit at low interest rates, the result is lower household 
15 T. Choukhmane et al, The One-Child Policy and Household Savings, LSE working papers, 
London School of  Economic, 18 September 2014.
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income – personal disposable income in China as a share of GDP 
was lower in 2014 (44%) than it was in 2000 (47.9%), and lower 
household consumption. 
The need to rebalance the economy requires major structural re-
forms, including: 
• banking sector reforms to rebalance the relative cost of funding 
and to reduce the implicit tax on households savings; 
• financial sector reforms to provide an alternative funding me-
chanism for firms and an alternative investment channel for hou-
seholds; 
• welfare system reform to reduce households’ savings for retire-
ment and health; 
• industrial policy reforms, aimed at restructuring debt-burdened 
SOEs and reducing overcapacity in many sectors. 
In many of these sectors, though, reforms are lagging behind, as 
state control of the economy is still widespread, or even worse, they 
are being reversed in a retreat from market mechanisms back to 
state dirigisme. 
Reforms lagging behind
Although the XIII Five Year Plan has confirmed the need for sup-
ply-side reforms (gongjice), there is no clear-cut view or proposal 
about the substance of these reforms. According to the National 
Development and Reform Commission (the main Chinese develop-
ment agency), China should become more innovative and efficient 
in producing the type of goods Chinese consumers want to buy. But 
the reforms they suggest, such as tax reductions on electric car pur-
chase, are more demand stimuli than supply-side interventions. Un-
fortunately Xinomics is light years away from the Reaganomics of 
the 1980s (which now inspires, at least in words, Xi’s supply-side 
reforms), both in diagnosis, and in prescriptions. At the moment it 
is not much more than the name given to awareness that large SOEs 
41Beijing’s Economy: Dream a Little Dream of  China?
and sectors and provinces where they are dominant (heavy industry 
in the northeast of the country, today already in recession) must be 
the protagonists of the new course of reforms, otherwise they will 
drag the entire country into recession.
Unfortunately, however, while the reform process is lagging be-
hind in many sectors, it is in fact being reversed precisely where 
most urgently needed, in industrial policy and financial sector re-
forms, where the drive towards market mechanisms to improve the 
allocation of resources has stopped, and Party control has been on 
the rise again. 
Industrial policies and SOEs 
Since the late 1990s, China’s industrial sector was significantly 
transformed through policy changes that allowed large state com-
panies – SOEs – to open up to individual investors, and created new 
ones, mainly through consolidation of existing firms. After reforms 
in the late 1990s, China’s SOEs – which date from the early 1950s, 
when private businesses as well as any infrastructure that survived 
the previous decades of war were nationalised – remained in “pillar 
industries” where they were reassembled into national champions.
Under the slogan “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small”, the 
Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee in 
1999 announced industrial reforms aimed at merging large SOEs 
into profit-maximizing industrial conglomerates while privatizing 
or closing smaller firms. As a result, the share of China’s industrial 
output from state-owned firms fell from 50 per cent at the end of 
the 1990s to 30 per cent in 2014. This dramatic shift has convinced 
some experts that a rapid transition to a market economy has been 
going on in China and that the private sector has been largely re-
sponsible for the rapid growth of the economy over the last 15 to 
20 years. 
However, “although the number of SOEs has declined sharply, 
they continue to dominate a number of sectors (such as petroleum 
and mining, telecommunications, utilities, transportation, and vari-
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ous industrial sectors); they are shielded from competition; they are 
the main sectors encouraged to invest overseas; and they dominate 
the listings on China’s stock indexes. One study found that SOEs 
constituted 50 per cent of the 500 largest manufacturing companies 
in China and 61 per cent of the top 500 service sector enterprises”16. 
According to Hsieh and Song, the SOEs reform campaign launched 
in 1999 has transformed the state sector in China, but this is due only 
partly to an effective change in corporate ownership structures, and 
partly to what is in fact a form of camouflaging existing state-owned 
or -controlled firms. Relying on micro-data from the Chinese Bureau 
of Statistics, in 2012 more than half of the state-owned firms were 
registered as some form of privately owned firms17. Over time the na-
ture of China’s SOEs has become increasingly complex. Many SOEs 
appear to be run like private companies and made initial public offer-
ings in China’s stock markets and those in other countries, although 
the Chinese government is usually the largest shareholder. 
By analysing data from China’s Annual Survey of Industries on 
all state-owned and private companies with revenues of more than 
5 million RMB, the authors show that the downsizing of the state 
sector actually boosted labour productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), narrowing the gap with privatized companies. Al-
though corporate restructuring freed labour and other resources into 
the more productive private sector, the TFP of newly established 
state-owned companies actually exceeded that of private compa-
nies. The authors calculate that the surviving SOEs accounted for 
more than 13 per cent of aggregate growth in the industrial sector 
during 1998-2007, newly formed SOEs accounted for 7 per cent of 
growth, while private firms accounted for only 3.2 per cent. Howev-
er, state-owned firms made far less progress in capital productivity 
(i.e. output per unit of value of fixed production assets), which re-
16 Morrison, op. cit.. The study cited here is Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang, Anna Janus, 
“State-owned Enterprises in China, Reform Dynamics and Impacts”, in Ross Garnaut, 
Ligang Song, Wing Thye Woo (eds.), China’s New Place in a World in Crisis: Economic, 
Geopolitical and Environmental Dimensions, ANU Press, 2009, p. 155.
17 Chang-Tai Hsieh, Zheng (Michael) Song,  Grasp the Large, Let Go of  the Small: The 
Transformation of  the State Sector in China, NBER Working Paper no. 21006., 2015.
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mained significantly lower than that of private firms, which means 
that SOEs use fixed capital stock inefficiently compared to private 
firms (mainly due to overcapacity).
Despite public announcements as recently as last September to 
make SOEs more efficient and market-oriented, in order to over-
come the problems of corporate debt accumulation and overcapac-
ity, today the Party is giving greater power to Party cells within ev-
ery SOE, reversing nearly two decades of attempts to remodel them 
along the lines of Western corporations. As a result, boards of direc-
tors will possibly be discouraged to make decisions based on mar-
ket conditions, profitability and hard budget constraints. According 
to the Financial Times, an article written by the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission in the influential party 
magazine Qiushi, or Seeking Truth, writes “all the major decisions 
of the company must be studied and suggested by the Party commit-
tees. Major operational management arrangements involving mac-
ro-control, national strategy and national security must be studied 
and discussed by the Party committees before any decision by the 
board of directors or company management”18. Still today, almost 
all executives at SOEs are party members and their corporate status 
is equivalent to that of the government officials who regulate them. 
The heads of the largest SOEs also enjoy senior party ranking.
According to the World Bank, of the 95 Chinese firms on the 
2014 Fortune Global 500 list, 82 were identified as having govern-
ment ownership of 50 per cent or more19. Moreover, “China has 
become one of the world’s most active users of industrial policies 
and administrations”20. While many observers used to think that it 
has not been clear so far to what extent the Chinese government 
has actually attempted to influence decisions made by the SOE’s 
that have become shareholding companies, now things are getting 
clearer, although not in the direction one would have expected.
18 L. Hornby, “China rows back on state-sector reforms”, Financial Times, 14 June 2016; 
L. Hornby, “China reverses industry’s free-market drive”, Financial Times, 15 June 2016.
19 “Global 500”, Fortune, 2014, http://fortune.com/global500/
20 The World Bank, China: 2030, 2012, p. 114.
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Financial sector, banks and the stock exchange 
Despite extensive reforms over the past three decades, the Chinese 
financial system is still largely underdeveloped with the banking 
sector still largely controlled by the central government, and the 
stock market heavily regulated (see Chapter 3 in this volume). 
Following the financial turmoil in mid-2015 (although the decline 
in China’s stock market was a normal correction and would have 
eventually occurred), the way monetary authorities handled the cri-
sis was largely criticised for introducing possibly even more uncer-
tainty in the stock market, although aimed at the opposite result. 
What the Chinese government did was to increase its control over 
listings, and backtrack from its commitment to enhancing free mar-
ket reforms.
More recently, at the time we are writing, a further confirmation 
that the Chinese financial system – more specifically the stock mar-
ket system – has not fared sufficiently well on reforms was given 
by the MSCI, the New York-based stock index provider, which has 
refused to include mainland Chinese shares in its Emerging Mar-
kets Index. This is because although Goldman Sachs had put the 
chance of approval at 70 per cent, and the IMF recently agreed to 
include the yuan as one of the currencies in its basket for Special 
Drawing Rights, A-shares of Chinese companies are mainly held 
by local investors and are in any case off-limits for foreign inves-
tors. According to Chang Liu, the China economist with Capital 
Economics, “… the MSCI’s decision primarily reflects the fact that 
financial reforms in China haven’t yet gone far enough rather than 
worries that policymakers will back-track on already implemented 
reforms”.21 
According to the Financial Times, the MSCI cited two reasons 
why it did not list Chinese stocks. One of them is China’s decision 
to impose a 20 per cent limit on repatriation of funds by foreign 
investors during share sell-offs, in order to reduce the volatility of 
21 As quoted in Saibal Dasgupta, “China misses out on MSCI Emerging Markets 
index”, The National, June 15 2016.
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the yuan and the stock market. The global compiler also called for 
removal of the Chinese rule that allows local exchanges in Shang-
hai and Shenzhen to impose pre-approval restrictions on launching 
financial products.
Although official statements say that the Chinese government 
will continue with capital market reform plans to develop a more 
market-oriented and properly regulated market, in order to establish 
long-term stability and a healthy capital market, there are no signs 
of such a progress so far.
Toward market economy status
After three decades of widespread economic reforms, more than 
80 countries have already granted China Market Economy Status 
(MES), including BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, 
such as Russia and Brazil, but also advanced economies, including 
Switzerland, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, but not any of 
its major trading partners, including the EU and the US. 
The European Union has not yet granted China MES, based on 
its latest assessment conducted in 2008, evaluating the influence of 
state intervention on prices and costs in China. Requests for MES 
are evaluated based on five criteria regarding government inter-
vention in the allocation of resources or business decisions in the 
economy, as follows :
1. a low degree of government influence over the allocation of 
resources and decisions of enterprises, whether directly or in-
directly (e.g. public bodies), for example through the use of 
state-fixed prices, or discrimination in the tax, trade or currency 
regimes;
2. an absence of state-induced distortions in the operation of enter-
prises linked to privatisation and the use of non-market trading 
or compensation system;
3. the existence and implementation of transparent and non-di-
scriminatory corporate law which ensures adequate corporate 
46 China Dream: Still Coming True?
governance (application of international accounting standards, 
protection of shareholders, public availability of accurate com-
pany information);
4. the existence and implementation of a coherent, effective and 
transparent set of laws which ensure respect for property rights 
and the operation of a functioning bankruptcy regime;
5. the existence of a genuine financial sector which operates inde-
pendently from the state and which in law and practice is subject 
to sufficient guarantee provisions and adequate supervision”22.
As the European Union Academic Programme (EUAP) in Hong 
Kong noed, “China must fulfil all five criteria for the EU to grant it 
MES, but according to the EU China has met only criterion 2 since 
2004. The 2008 assessment acknowledged the progress that China 
has made in reforming the economy and law but the remaining four 
criteria were still unmet. Therefore, the EU has still not yet granted 
MES to China”23. The United States Department of Commerce is 
much stricter than the EU when examining whether a country is 
eligible for MES, as it also takes into account interference in trade 
union affairs – indeed state control of trade union organisations – 
and the lack of free collective bargaining.
According to Section 15 of China’ Protocol of Accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession agreement signed in 
2001, China argues that it is automatically entitled to MES by the 
EU after December 2016, but some legal analyses would show that 
there is no legal automaticity in the EU granting MES to China 
after that deadline and a range of organisations representing Euro-
pean industry strongly contests the suggestion that China should 
automatically be granted MES in 2016. According WTO rules, each 
importing WTO member can decide whether they treat China as a 
market economy or not based on their national law. 
22 “One-year to go: The debate over China’s Market Economy Status (MES) heats up”, 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, Bruxelles, European 
Union, 2015, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2015_330
23 European Union Academic Programme Hong Kong, “The issue of  granting the 
Market Economy Status (MES) to China by the European Union”, February 23 2016.
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As the Financial Time stated, ”attaining market economy status 
has been one of Beijing’s main goals in international economic di-
plomacy since it joined the WTO in 2001”24. According to Beijing, 
the state’s presence in the economy has shrunk drastically in the 
past 15 years, while the role of the state has actually increased in 
several EU economies. One simple way to assess the size of the 
public sector is to measure general government revenue as share of 
GDP, which remains far higher in the Eurozone on average (50%) 
than in the United States (35%) and twice as high as China (25%). 
It is hard to argue that China, particularly given the massive dis-
tortions from its state-directed lending, is a market economy, and 
the Chinese government itself claims that China is in fact a socialist 
market economy. This is why most countries have reasonably “con-
cluded that China does not meet the criteria whereby its lending 
and production decisions are substantially made without state di-
rection”, [while] “Beijing has been much keener to lobby for MES 
than to reform its own economy to attain it on merit”25.
Why is being recognised as a market economy very important 
for China’s leaders? Partly for domestic propaganda: it would prove 
to the Chinese people that the Party’s rule is not only consistent 
with but provides the right system to reach economic well-being, 
while protecting the people from the vagaries of free markets. 
More practically, as the Financial Time underlines, “securing mar-
ket economy status would benefit China by requiring global trade 
regulators to compare the price of Chinese exports to its domestic 
market – instead of higher-priced third countries – in anti-dumping 
cases and thus limit their ability to impose tariffs”26.
After US complaints to the World Trade Organisation, China 
has recently withdrawn subsidies for its exporters, but the recent 
reversal in the Communist Party’s control of SOEs management 
boards makes it harder for China to argue that it deserves being 
granted MES by major world economies, especially the EU (since 
the United States has already refused to grant MES to China).
24 “China’s flawed case for market economy status”, Financial Times, May 11 2016
25 Ibid.
26 “China fights for market economy status”, Financial Times, May 9 2016.
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A dream for the nation, much less for the people?
In an inspiring report/article on the China Dream at the beginning 
of Xi’s term27, The Economist reported that a number of journalists 
went on strike in early 2013 in protest over a censored version of 
an article in a state-controlled newspaper, Southern Weekend, titled 
“The Chinese dream: a dream of constitutionalism”. While the orig-
inal article said that only a division of powers could allow China to 
become a “free and strong country”, the published version did not 
mention the constitution.
According to a famous song by Ms Sisi Chen, the Chinese dream 
is “A dream of a strong nation […] a dream of a wealthy people”28. 
But Mr Xi is facing increasing difficulty in convincing the people 
that China can be “rich and strong” while remaining a one-party 
state. If the China Dream is not the American Dream, what is it? For 
the time being Mr Xi is keeping the course he will be following un-
clear. At the beginning of his term, Mr Xi had to stick to the Party’s 
long-term plans to achieve a “moderately well-off society” by the 
time of the Party’s 100th anniversary in 2021 (one year before Mr 
Xi would have to retire) and creation of a “rich, strong, democratic, 
civilised and harmonious socialist modern country” by 2049, the 
100th anniversary of the Peoples’ Republic of China. But demands 
for clarity mount as the middle-income groups grow increasingly 
worried about environmental degradation and social unrest. In the 
meantime, they are probably dreaming their own dreams for the 
near future, hoping they are not too different from Xi’s.
27 “Chasing the Chinese Dream”, The Economist, 4 May 2013.
28 Ibid.
